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CRIMINAL LAW: MANDAMUS/PROHIBITION 
 
Summary 
 
The Court focused on the issue of whether a district court can grant a motion to compel 
disclosure of criminal background information of veniremembers gathered by the prosecution. The 
Court determined that a district court has the authority to order the prosecution to share criminal 
background information of veniremembers obtained from databases that the defense cannot access.  
 
Background 
 
 The defendant, Francisco Ojeda, filed a pretrial motion to compel the State to disclose 
information regarding the criminal histories of potential jury members. Ojeda alleged (and the 
State did not dispute) that the State uses government databases to view veniremember criminal 
backgrounds, to which the defense does not have access. The district court granted the motion and 
ordered the State to “disclose the criminal histories the State gathers, if any, for potential venire 
members.” The district court identified their authority under NRS 179A.100(7)(j) (2015), which 
requires “[r]ecords of criminal history [to] be disseminated by an agency of criminal justice” to 
those authorized by “court order.”2 The district court stated their goal to reduce disparity between 
the access of the State and that of the defense. The State filed a petition to prevent release of such 
information, stating the district court had no authority to compel these disclosures. This appeal 
followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
We exercise our discretion to consider the State’s petition 
 
The Court has the sole discretion to consider a writ of prohibition or mandamus. Writ relief 
is usually only available when no “adequate and speedy” legal remedy remains.3 The Court, here, 
however, intervened to resolve a question of first impression which arises somewhat frequently 
and acts in the interest of sound judicial economy and administration. Prohibition is appropriate 
when restraining a district judge acting “without or in excess of its jurisdiction.”4 Mandamus is 
appropriate “to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.”5 Since 
the State has no available remedy, the Court examined the petition in the interest of sound judicial 
economy and administration.  
 
 
 
A district court has the authority to compel the State to disclose veniremember criminal histories 
                                                     
1  By Myrra Dvorak. 
2  NRS 179A.100(7)(j) (2017). 
3  Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008).  
4  Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991).  
5  State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931, 267 P.3d 777, 779 (2011).  
  The State argued that the district court acted outside of its authority when it granted the 
defense’s motion to compel; however, the Court disagreed. While the United States Constitution 
does not require such disclosures, the Court held that the district court still has the authority to 
compel the State as it enjoys broad discretion in regard to discovery disputes as well as under NRS 
179A.100(7)(j).  
 
The district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in requiring the State to share 
veniremember criminal history information 
 
Since the Court found the district court had authority to order such disclosures, the Court 
then needed to determine whether the district court acted arbitrarily or capriciously in compelling 
the State. In order to find the district court acted in this manner, the Court needed to decide whether 
the discretion was founded on prejudice or preference contrary to the evidence or the rules of law. 
Here, the district court only made one factual finding that the State’s use of governmental databases 
created a disparity, and the Court agreed.  
 
While the judicial system does not require parity of information, the district court may still 
aim to correct such a disparity. The district court possesses the inherent authority to create rules 
designed to prevent injustice and preserve judicial process integrity.  Additionally, the information 
discovered by the prosecution through these databases does not quality as a work-product subject 
to privilege as it does not contain “the mental processes of the attorney.”6  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that upon motion by the defense, district courts must require the State to 
disclose information regarding the criminal backgrounds of veniremembers that is otherwise 
inaccessible to the defense. The district court here had such authority and did not exercise its 
authority in an arbitrary or capricious manner nor as an abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court denied 
the State’s petition. 
 
Pickering, J., dissenting: 
 
 The dissent rejected the majority’s new criminal procedure rule. The dissent noted that 
district courts have no authority to do so under any constitution (federal or state), statute, or other 
formal rule, and the majority relied solely upon their own inherent authority and the discretion of 
district courts to uphold this rule. The dissent pointed out concerns of infringements of privacy for 
jurors as well as laws which already govern information in governmental databases.  
 Moreover, the dissent identified a case that already addresses a close variant of the question 
presented in this case. In Artigua-Morales v. State, the Court already recognized that criminal 
defendants do not have a constitutional right to the prosecution’s research on the background of 
jurors.7 Nevada statutes for criminal discovery also lack such required disclosures.8 In fact, such 
statutes seem to allude that it prohibits these kinds of disclosures. 
                                                     
6  Floyd v. State, 119 Nev. 156, 167, 42 P.3d 249, 257 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7  130 Nev. 795, 335 P.3d 179 (2014).  
8  See NRS 174.233–95.  
 The dissent further rejected a holding based on a fairness-based mandatory disclosure rule. 
While disparities may exist between the prosecution’s access to juror information and that of the 
defense, creating a rule requiring district courts to grant defenses’ motions to compel would affect 
other stakeholders in a negative manner. This includes potential jurors, as their privacy interests 
may be harmed in order to correct the information disparity. This may also negatively impact 
government entities, which gather information beyond just criminal background histories. Such 
positions ought to be considered through the formal rule-making process, affording public debate 
and input and the positives and negatives of the rule.  
 Juror’s privacy is particularly subject to harm. Their questionnaires are available to both 
the public and the press, and disclosures such as these pose the potential of releasing particularly 
personal information. Each juror is expected to disclose their criminal background history during 
the veniremember process; however, the databases collect far more information than just criminal 
history. Such files may include “home addresses, birth dates, social security numbers, distinctive 
markings such as tattoos, suspected gang affiliation, weapons possession, suspected terrorist 
activity, and special risks to police and medical response teams posed by residents with 
documented mental illness or high-risk communicable diseases like AIDS.” 
 State statutes also restrict access and dissemination of the information accessible to the 
prosecution. For example, NRS 179A.800, Art. IV(3) requires that “[a]ny record obtained . . . may 
be used only for the official purposes for which the record was requested.”9 The majority fails to 
address statutes which may already prevent the release of such information, and the statute upon 
which the majority relies simply allows for disclosure but does not require automatic disclosure to 
correct disparities in jury selection.  
 The dissent recognized that other jurisdictions have also addressed this issue and a wide 
array of responses have come forth from these deliberations; however, none of the cases cited by 
the majority actually mandate required disclosures by the prosecution to the defense of juror-
background information. The few states that do have such disclosures also have unique court rules 
or state constitutions allowing for promulgation of such a rule. 
 Finally, the dissent rebuked the majority’s dependence upon inherent authority for the 
creation of their mandatory disclosure rule. The dissent noted that this authority “is not 
infinite . . . and it must be exercised within the confines of valid existing law.”10 This authority 
ought only to be exercised “when established methods fail or in an emergency situation,” neither 
of which has occurred here.11 
                                                     
9  NRS 179A.800, art. IV(3) (2017).  
10  Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 263, 163 P.3d 428, 441 (2007) (footnote omitted).  
11  Id.  
